With the Ottoman Empire’s eventual collapse, the question of Ottoman “decline” became one of the most discussed and researched topics in Ottoman history. Where the roots of this decline lie and when it actually started has been considered and debated by many, including both premodern Ottoman intellectuals and modern historians, who differ in opinion. Ottoman history was classically periodized until the second half of the 20th century, with the formation of the state by Osman I to the first half of Suleiman’s reign classified as the “Rise” period, from the second half of Suleiman’s reign to the Vaka-i Hayriye (Auspicious Incident), the disbandment of the janissary corps by Mahmud II classified as the “Stagnation” period, and the rest until the fall of the empire classified as the “Decline” period. However, this classical periodization has been subject to change in the last few decades. There have been numerous attempts by historians to develop alternative periodizations, but there isn’t one absolute periodization style currently accepted as the norm.
This classical interpretation of rise, stagnation, and decline was also present in the times of premodern-era Ottoman intellectuals and scholars and influenced their approach to the issues of their time. Many were influenced by Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyyah theory and based their ideas and works on it.
According to Ibn Khaldun’s theory, the foundation of every state lies in the intensity of its Asabiyyah, a form of group consciousness that allows a clan to establish political dominance. At the start of their rule, the group consciousness is strong and intense. This provides a zeal that encourages territorial or political expansion, and the clan reaches its peak. At this time, luxury and pride become common, and laziness causes the tribe to decline and lose power. At the end of the cycle, another tribe with a higher sense of cohesion and unity replaces the old one and the cycle repeats[1].
The ideas of Ibn Khaldun as a prominent scholar of the time undoubtedly influenced premodern Ottoman intellectuals’ ideas and how they assessed the condition of the empire. Most argued that the reason evil was spreading among the people and the empire’s ministries had become inefficient, staffed by unqualified officers, and rife with corruption was the slackening of recruitment standards, leniency in the application of law, exploitation of peasants, obsession over luxury, and sloth. These ideas mirror Ibn Khaldun’s thesis in that they reflect an apparent loss of Asabiyyah in the sense that the ruling ‘tribe’ was idle, indulgent, and complacent, becoming obsessed with luxury and indifferent to the evil and corruption they were supposed to root out.
In the premodern era, the theses of a few intellectuals stand out. One of these intellectuals, Lütfi Paşa, was the Grand Vizier of Suleiman before he was dismissed from the office after a series of events in the harem[2]. After this incident he retired to his estate in Dimetoka and focused on producing works such as the Âsafnâme and Tevâriḫ-i Âl-i ‘Os̱mân, the former being like a mirror for ministers, a treatise of advice, and the latter being a history of the Ottoman Empire and his experiences in the courts of the sultans. Although there is no indication that he was directly influenced by Ibn Khaldun, his emphasis on moral decay, administrative corruption, and the need for reform indicates an inspiration from Ibn Khaldun.
In the Âsafnâme, we see one of the first mentions of the “decline” of the empire. Lütfi Pasha starts by discussing related his ascension to the office of Grand Vizier and recalls, ‘When I took office as Grand Vizier, I found the council’s affairs scattered and corrupt. For seven years, I tried my best to organize them’[3]. In these lines, we witness the first indications of a ‘decline’ where Lütfi Pasha complains about the conditions of the diwan in the times of Suleiman. He goes on to mention the virtues and traits of an ideal Grand Vizier and warns his successors on the topics of war, treasury, taxation, use of couriers, and so on[4].
The mention of disorder and corruption in the diwan as early as the era of Suleiman indicates that although it was the golden age and the most illustrious and prestigious time of the empire, the rot had begun to spread in the state’s bureaucracy, contrary to common belief. While the mentions of corruption and decadence in the state by ex-statesmen appear to be a very objective and truthful source, it is important to keep in mind that these intellectuals’ opinions and theses on the Ottoman decline may be influenced by personal experiences, ambitions, and grudges, as seen in the cases of Koçi Bey and Mustafa Âlî[5].
Mustafa Âlî was another intellectual of the premodern Ottoman era. He worked as a scribe in the Diwan in the early years of his career, but because of his desire for high office, neither any prince nor Sultan Süleyman accepted his requests for a position as a madrasa teacher or judge[6]. He addresssed to the sultan concerning the problems of the empire and how to solve them, but his advice was generally disregarded. He did seem to be worried about the future of the empire, but his courtly flattery and ‘ambition’ were among the reasons he was not able to achieve the ranks he aimed for and wasn’t popular among his peers.
He was appointed to many offices across the empire, yet was never satisfied. He kept asking for promotions and transfers to other offices and was once fired and got unemployed for two years after he presented the sultan with two of his works, Nusretnâme and Câmiu’l-buhûr. It seems constant petitioning of the higher offices was not the way for a promotion. Although Âlî did not attract much attention in his official duties, he gained considerable fame through his intense literary activity and, in particular, his historiography. It is understood that he authored nearly sixty prose and verse works, most of which were written in pursuit of official positions.[7]
Koçi Bey, a devshirme recruit to the Enderun, was known to oppose the increasing prevalence of tımarlı sipahis—provincial cavalrymen, mostly composed of Turcomans—and may have seen them as a rival faction that reduced the relevance of janissaries and counteracted the influence of the devshirme. Although one should not dismiss the writings of a renowned intellectual and advisor of the sultan, it is best to approach such cases with caution in which the one who produces the sources is in an opposing faction to whom they write about. In this case, the power struggle of the devshirme and the tımarlı sipahis could have very well caused Koçi Bey to describe the tımarlı sipahi’s actions and rising importance in a negative light.
In his Risale, Koçi Bey writes about the protocols of the palace, educating the residents and guests on ceremonies, etiquette, the procedures of the palace and about the widespread corruption and evil in the empire. He complained about the sale and granting of timars to those who bid and bribed the most. The deteriorating discipline and merit of the Janissary corps as well, with “outsiders” and unqualified men joining the corps as they had once been an elite force, loyal only to the sultan, which comprised originally of Christian boys who were taken by the devshirme system and gone through a long and hard training, now taking in Muslim-born soldiers as well and generally had less strict rules and meddling in the empire’s politics, threatening the throne itself like in the case of Genç Osman (Osman II), who tried to abolish the system and remove the Janissaries, but was overthrown and executed. Another concern was the depopulation of the countryside caused by the exploitation and heavy taxation of the peasants with the popularization of iltizam (tax farming) deriving from the empire’s sudden need for money in the 17th century because of the changing ways of warfare. Koçi Bey opposed iltizam, arguing that it lowered the crown’s authority and caused extreme taxation and oppression of peasants.
He was able to contribute to the reforms in the empire with his Risale, as evident by Sultan Murad IV’s sudden change of policy in his 20s after having been presented with Koçi Bey’s Risale and taking a more absolutist and ruthless attitude. This shift of attitude showed itself as Murad IV strictly enforced laws, fought corruption, and restored the crown’s authority. He banned coffeehouses, alcohol, and tobacco and implemented a curfew from sunset to sunrise, believing that these substances and places were the cause of the spread of evil. Stricter enforcement of laws and various other reforms seemed to work, albeit for a short time, resulting in the reconquest of Baghdad in 1638.
Though his reforms were short-lived, since most of them were reversed after he passed away, they did partially mend the cracks in the empire’s administration. These examples of statesmen trying to restore the power and glory of the empire show that it was not in a constant decline and that there were indeed efforts for reform and modernization that, although they may have been influenced by personal goals and ambitions, helped to recover the empire’s strength. This makes it harder to periodize Ottoman history in a classic “Rise-Stagnation-Decline” model since the situation of the empire was not on a constant trajectory downwards but rather reflected a series of fluctuations.
Recent scholars argue for another factor in the empire’s crisis: climate. At the end of the 16th century, Anatolia experienced a severe drought that reduced agricultural yield. Historian Sam White argues that this may have been the catalyst for the Celali Rebellions and the increased cases of banditry in the 1600s, saying, “The initial rise in banditry probably reflected the impacts of the drought and its attendant hardships.”[8] With the Little Ice Age’s most severe period affecting Anatolia, the peasants —who were no longer enjoying previous prosperity because failed harvests meant rising prices and food insecurity— were more prone to unrest.
One reason Suleiman the Magnificent and other sultans of his period did not experience rebellions and saw prospering times throughout the empire was favorable climate and weather conditions. The 15th and the first half of the 16th century experienced high rainfall across Anatolia, which reduced peasant concern for agricultural production since better climate and rainfall yielded higher crop output. Instead, through the end of the 16th century, dramatically reduced rainfall and the effects of the Little Ice Age resulted in famines in Anatolia. Sam White mentions the severity of the situation as “The drought of the 1590s was the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean for the past six centuries and by far the worst in the empire’s history.”[9] This sudden shortage, coupled with extreme taxation, caused rebellions, banditry and decline in a core region of the Ottoman Empire. He describes the deteriorating situation as he writes “In late 1591, after the first season of drought, incidents of banditry multiplied rapidly, accelerating every year through early 1596, by which time we run into a gap in the surviving records.”[10]
The Little Ice Age’s effects were not only seen in Anatolia, “and the first indications in Ottoman records appeared the following spring, when the sultan complained to the inspector of water shortages in Istanbul. At the same time, drought began to destroy harvests in the more arid agricultural regions… By 1592, the Damascus region also reported ‘much famine,’ leading the sultan to remove the current kadı. The following year, the shortages spread to Baghdad and then the Hijaz, where officials in Medina pleaded for more grain from Egypt…” and the impact of climate was observed throughout the empire.[11] Drought was affecting everyone in the empire and this empire-wide scarcity sowed discontent.
The impact of climate proves that the reason the Ottoman Empire was losing pace and power was not merely moral decline and corruption. Natural factors are one of the reasons we see the times of Suleiman as a “Golden Age,” But by the end of the 16th century, the atmosphere in the empire suddenly changed when the peasants who once experienced a prosperous life suddenly faced failed harvests and widespread famine and saw growing banditry across the empire’s territories. What was once perceived as “decline” can now be seen as instability and the empire’s efforts to adapt to volatile environmental conditions.
The matter of environmental effects presents another fault in the understanding of classical Ottoman “decline” as it shows that the empire was not experiencing an uninterrupted decline and was rather subject to fluctuations and adaptations. With another fault spotted with the classical “decline” paradigm, modern scholars started to question the very integrity of the concept of “decline” and if it was sensible in the first place.
In the mid-20th century, historians like Bernard Lewis argued that the writings of premodern Ottoman intellectuals reflected clear evidence of imperial decline. However, treating these works at face value risks mistaking the critiques of office holders with personal agendas and biases as absolute facts that correspond to decline. The works of intellectuals such as Âlî whose ambitions shaped their writings could not have reflected the situation of the empire truthfully. To use the efforts of many ministers to strengthen the Asabiyyah in the empire as a tool to support the idea of an uninterrupted decline constructs a very fragile argument. Statements like “Ottoman statesmanship was still looking backward to the golden age in the past” are also problematic as the use of the concept of “Golden Age” in Ottoman history does not reflect reality in its true form, especially considering the environmental factors we have already discussed.[12]
Recent scholars have argued over the literature of “decline”, with some suggesting alternative models of periodization. One is Linda T. Darling’s “Expansion, Consolidation, Transformation” model of periodization which offers a more flexible and realistic understanding of Ottoman history. She argues that the concept of a “Rise” era is faulty. Only considering the major defeat at Ankara (1402) and the Interregnum that followed already undermines the concept of a constant “Rise”. A middle period of “Stagnation” is also not sensible as a period of status quo for hundreds of years is not realistic. Instead, she prefers “Consolidation” as a middle ground, where expansion had slowed down dramatically but had not come to a halt; when efforts for consolidation and control increased and the empire was starting to switch from territorial expansion to a bureaucratic expansion and provincial integration as she says “Around the middle of the reign of Süleyman, the empire changed from an expansionist, messianic, world-conquering force into a Great Power, a state co-existing with other states, dominant but not all-conquering. As expansion gave way to consolidation, the forms of established institutions were altered and old arrangements gave place to new ones.”[13] Lastly, an era of “Transformation” perfectly suits the last third of the empire’s lifespan, considering that the efforts for reform and modernization had grown immensely as the empire tried to keep pace with the many revolutions across the world and the spread of nationalistic ideas.
Lastly, another view that considers the “Golden Age” of the empire a myth, and is skeptical of periodization while arguing they distort history is presented by Cemal Kafadar. Arguing that periodization oversimplifies the subject and imposes a filter on history, Kafadar is cautious of rigid periodization in his works and instead refers to a “Classical Age” only if absolutely necessary. Kafadar tries to shift the debate by answering “how we narrate what happened” instead of “what happened.” His contributions to the discussion are summarized by the idea that “There was no decline but neither was there a golden age.” He opposes the idea that premodern Ottoman intellectuals’ works be taken as objective truth but argues that they should be approached with caution considering the personal motivations and biases of the authors.
Overall, it is clear that the narrative of a “Decline” is not truthful and misrepresents history by either oversimplifying it or putting a filter that biases the reader’s understanding. When we consider the effects of climate, biased opinions of Ottoman intellectuals and the newer models of periodizations offered by modern scholars, what we see are not fixed periods of Rise, Stagnation and Decline but rather a history with constant transformation and change. This perspective prevents us from oversimplification and biased understanding but helps us take each event on its own, not restrain centuries of history into a single label that misleads us.
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Darling, Linda T. “Another Look at Periodization in Ottoman History.” The Turkish Studies Association Journal 26, No. 2 (2002): 19–28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43383654.
Fleischer, Cornell H. “Bureaucrat and Intellectual in The Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali, 1546-1600.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, No. 1 (1990): 127–28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/164395.
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Lewis, Bernard. “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline.” Islamic Studies 1, No. 1 (1962): 71–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20832621.
Lütfi Paşa. 1980. Âsafnâme. Edited by Ahmet Uğur. Ankara, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları.
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“The Myth of The Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness In The Postsüleymanic Era.” 1993. In Süleymân The Second And His Time, edited by Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar, 37-48. N.P.: Isis Press.
White, Sam. The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Mustafa Çağrici, “Asabiyet”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/asabiyet. ↑
- Mehmet İpşirli, “Lutfi Paşa”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/lutfi-pasa. ↑
- Lütfi Paşa, Âsafnâme, haz. Ahmet Uğur (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1980), 244–245. ↑
- Mehmet İpşirli, “Âsafnâme”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/asafname. ↑
- Cemal Kafadar, “The Myth Of The Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness In The Postsüleymanic Era” 1993, 44-46 ↑
- Beki̇r Kütükoğlu, “Âlî Mustafa Efendi̇”, Tdv İslâm Ansiklopedisi, https://Islamansiklopedisi.Org.Tr/Ali-Mustafa-Efendi#1. ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 141, quoted in. ↑
- Ibid, 150 ↑
- Ibid, 150 ↑
- Ibid, 142 ↑
- Lewis, Bernard. “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline.” Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (1962): 83. http://www.Jstor.Org/Stable/20832621. ↑
Darling, Linda T. “Another Look at Periodization in Ottoman History.” The Turkish Studies Association Journal 26, no. 2 (2002): 22. http://www.Jstor.Org/Stable/43383654. ↑
